Wasserman's Appellate Summaries

June 2, 2000
By Lawrence Wasserman, Esq.

Netlaw Libraries welcomes attorney Lawrence Wasserman as a new website contributor. We are pleased to announce that his guest column, which synopsizes the recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court, the six California appellate districts, as well as some of the recent and interesting decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, will be appearing as a regular feature for members and guests visiting the Netlaw Libraries website. We hope that you will find it to be a good way to start your legal research day and welcome your comments and criticisms regarding the column.

United States v. Boyd
Case No. 99-10384
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

CRIMINAL-SPEEDY TRIAL ACT-ISSUANCE OF VIOLATION NOTICE AND SHORT DETENTION BY MILITARY DOES NOT TRIGGER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT LIMITATION OF TIME TO BRING TO TRIAL
On October 14, 1997, Boyd drove to McClellan Air Force Base and requested entry. A dispute arose between Boyd and a guard about the requirements necessary for entry, which escalated into a scuffle. The gate guard escorted Boyd to the Visitor Center where she was detained. While detained, Boyd was questioned and an identification check was done. After an hour, Boyd was given a violation notice alleging a violation of resisting or impeding an officer or employee of the federal government. The violation notice ordered Boyd to appear at a date and time "To Be Notified" and she was released. The base commander sent Boyd a letter barring her from the base for three years. She claimed that she never saw the letter and entered the base several times afterwards. The government charged Boyd with a misdemeanor count of assaulting a federal employee. Boyd's motion to dismiss the information for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as well as a motion to suppress certain evidence were denied. Boyd was convicted of assault of a federal employee and entering the base after being ordered not to re-enter.
HELD: The Speedy Trial Act requires that any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charge. A complaint must be issued at the time of arrest in order to trigger the 30-day limitation. A brief detention and the issuance of a "violation notice" do not trigger the Speedy Trial Act. Affirmed.

Does I through XXIII v. Advanced Textile
Case No. 99-16713
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

LABOR-RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED WITH LITIGATION ANONYMOUSLY-APPEAL-COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
Plaintiffs in this case are foreign garment workers on the island of Saipan. They alleged multiple violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the complaint. They used fictitious names in their complaint because they fear that, if their identities are disclosed to defendants and other nonparties to this action, they will be fired from their jobs, deported from Saipan, and arrested and imprisoned by the People's Republic of China. The district court dismissed the action with leave to amend the complaint to state plaintiffs' true names.
HELD: The Court had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. When the named plaintiffs in a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action demonstrate that they have an objectively reasonable fear of extraordinarily severe retaliation, they may conceal their identities from defendants at least until the district court rules on plaintiffs' motion for court-ordered notice to potential class members and potential class members have been given an opportunity to join the suit. The district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs permission to proceed anonymously at this stage of the litigation. Reversed.

People v. Lasko
Case No. S069354
Supreme Court of California

CRIMINAL-INSTRUCTIONS-VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER REQUIRES AN TO KILL-UNINTENTIONAL KILLING IN UNREASONABLE SELF DEFENSE AS VOLUNTARY OR UNREASONABLE MANSLAUGHTER
Lasko was employed by the victim, Fitzpatrick and lived in Fitzpatrick's home. Lasko bludgeoned Fitzpatrick to death and was captured at the scene by neighbors with a large amount of cash on his person. Fitzpatrick was known to carry a large amount of money. At trial Lasko's defense was that Fitzpatrick initiated an attack with a baseball bat. Lasko responded by throwing water that he was heating on Fitzpatrick, taking the bat away and striking him with the bat, without the intent to kill him. Lasko was convicted of second-degree murder. The jury was instructed that intent to kill was an essential element of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal concluded, it lacked the power to redefine the elements of voluntary manslaughter, because it was bound by decisions of the California Supreme court that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill.
HELD: Under California law, murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or a fetus, with malice aforethought. Malice is express when the killer harbors a deliberate intent to unlawfully take away a human life. Malice is implied when the killer lacks an intent to kill but acts with conscious disregard for life, knowing such conduct endangers the life of another. When a killer intentionally but unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the killer lacks malice and is guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. This is also true of a killer who, acting with conscious disregard for life and knowing that the conduct endangers the life of another, unintentionally but unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. The court also gave the instruction that; a person, who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of murder. Instructions similar to those given here do not clearly explain to the jury whether an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. Here, this lack of clarity could not have prejudiced defendant, because, in finding defendant guilty of second degree murder rather than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, the jury must have necessarily concluded he did not act in unreasonable self-defense. Affirmed.

People v. Blakely
Case No. S062453
Supreme Court of California

CRIMINAL-VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER MUST BE WITHOUT MALICE-REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO KILL-UNREASONABLE BELIEF OF NECESSITY OF SELF DEFENSE
In a drunken brawl Blakeley drew a knife and stabbed the victim, killing him. At trial the court instructed the jury on the charged crime of murder as well as the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. As to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court explained: Every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought but with an intent to kill is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. The requested instruction that, a killing is involuntary manslaughter when the killer, acting in an unreasonable but good faith belief in the necessity of self-defense, unintentionally causes the victim's death, was refused. Blakeley was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
HELD: A defendant who, with conscious disregard for life and the knowledge that such conduct endangers the life of another, unintentionally but unlawfully kills in a sudden quarrel or the heat of passion is guilty only of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Voluntary manslaughter is also committed when a defendant, acting with conscious disregard for life and the knowledge that the conduct is life-endangering, unintentionally but unlawfully kills while having an unreasonable but good faith belief in the need to act in self defense. In their closing arguments to the jury, both the prosecutor and defense counsel told the jury that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense was involuntary, not voluntary, manslaughter. If the jury had concluded that defendant had unintentionally killed the victim in unreasonable self-defense, it most likely would not have convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter, which, it was told, requires an intent to kill. For reversal there must be a reasonable probability, not a mere theoretical possibility, that the instructional error affected the outcome of the trial. The Court did not find such a reasonable probability existed. Affirmed.

People v. Mendoza
Case No. F032945
California Court of Appeal, Fifth District

CRIMINAL-CIVIL COMMITMENT AS SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR-ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE-HARMLESS ERROR IN OPINION OF EXPERTS
A jury found Mendoza to be a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the Welfare and Institutions Code. At the trial probation officer reports and police reports were admitted into evidence without objection. These reports established the details of the underlying offenses. The prosecution's experts were also allowed to render their opinions as to whether Mendoza's prior offenses had been committed with force, duress, or involved substantial sexual conduct. Mendoza had two prior convictions for committing lewd and lascivious acts upon children under the age of 14. The trial court ordered appellant to be committed for a period of two years at a state mental hospital.
HELD: A "sexually violent predator" is defined as a "person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. Even assuming, that the failure to object was excused, the Court found that the probation and police reports were properly admitted. The Welfare and Institutions code particularly states that the details underlying the commission of an offense that led to a prior conviction, including a predatory relationship with the victim, may be shown by documentary evidence, including, but not limited to, preliminary hearing transcripts, trial transcripts, probation and sentencing reports, and evaluations by the State Department of Mental Health Assuming the trial court erred in allowing the experts to give their opinion as to whether Mendoza's acts constituted "sexually violent offenses," Mendoza can show no prejudice. Affirmed.

Spitzer v. The Good Guys
Case No. A086999
California Court of Appeal, First District, Division Two

ORDER
Republication of opinion filed on May 1, 2000, to provide certification order and correct date information.

PLCM Group v. Drexler
Case No. S080201
Supreme Court of California

ORDER
Modification of opinion appearing at 22 Cal.4th 1084, not effecting the judgment.

Wasserman's Archived Appellate Summaries

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