Wasserman's Appellate Summaries
June 28, 2000
By Lawrence Wasserman, Esq.
Netlaw Libraries welcomes attorney Lawrence Wasserman as a new website contributor. We are pleased to announce that his guest column, which synopsizes the recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court, the six California appellate districts, as well as some of the recent and interesting decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, will be appearing as a regular feature for members and guests visiting the Netlaw Libraries website. We hope that you will find it to be a good way to start your legal research day and welcome your comments and criticisms regarding the column.
United States v. Benavides-Benavides
Case No. 99-10270
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CRIMINAL-EVIDENCE-CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Benavidez was arrested as he tried to enter the U.S. His van was found to contain seventy-six bundles of marijuana, weighing about 169 pounds, in the doors and walls of the van. Benavidez took a polygraph examination and sought to introduce certain exculpatory portions of the examination at trial. The evidence was ruled inadmissible.
HELD: Prior to 1986, evidence of the results of a polygraph examination was potentially admissible. In 1986, the Court assessed the state of the law and polygraph science and adopted a per se rule that unstipulated polygraph evidence was inadmissible as technical or scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it does not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In 1993 the U.S. Supreme Court held that polygraph evidence may be admitted depending upon: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the error rate is known and standards exist controlling the operation of the technique; and, (4) whether the theory or technique has gained general acceptance. The trial court found that criteria number 4 was not satisfied and excluded the evidence. Affirmed.
United States v. Campos
Case No. 97-50635
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CRIMINAL-EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINER
Campos was arrested as she tried to enter the U.S. The van Campos was driving was found to contain s eighty-nine packages, weighing 151 pounds of marijuana in a ceiling compartment above the passenger side seat. At a pretrial polygraph test Campos answered no to two questions concerning whether she knew that the van contained marijuana. The examiner concluded the answers were truthful. Her motion to admit the testimony of the polygraph examiner was denied, without a hearing. Campos was convicted of importation and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
HELD: A prohibited `opinion or inference' under the Federal Rules of Evidence is testimony from which it necessarily follows, if the testimony is credited, that the defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens rea. The polygraph examiner's testimony that Campos was truthful in stating that she did not know that she was transporting marijuana leaves no room for inference, but rather, compels the conclusion that she did not possess the requisite knowledge. This testimony is not admissible. If evidence is inadmissible by application of one evidentiary rule, there is no need for a court to determine whether it satisfies predicate evidentiary standards pertaining to another rule. A hearing was not required. Affirmed.
Freis v. Soboroff
Case No. B123194
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four
CIVIL-WITHHOLDING OF TAXES BY PAYOR ON REFUSAL OF PAYEE TO PROVIDE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER-FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Freis is the owner of certain gas and oil royalties payable by the City of Los Angeles. Because plaintiff refused to provide a Social Security number for the purpose of taxpayer identification, defendants withheld 31 percent of the payments as backup withholding for federal income taxes, as required by federal statutes and Internal Revenue Service regulations. Freis sued. The City's demurrer was sustained and judgment entered for the City of Los Angeles.
HELD: Because federal law required defendants to withhold portions of the royalty payments for taxes, plaintiff cannot state a cause of action, such as conversion or breach of contract, against defendants. Freis does not have a Social Security number and chooses not to obtain one because of his sincerely held religious belief that such a number is the "mark of the Beast" referred to in scripture, and he does not desire to volunteer into any system which would obligate him, as a Christian with sincerely held Holy Bible beliefs, to take the mark, and the number, of the Beast. On the merits, it is not unconstitutional to require a taxpayer to provide a Social Security number, because the government's compelling interest in identifying taxpayers outweighs the incidental effect on the practice of religion. Affirmed.
Marylander v. Superior Court/Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
Case No. B138779
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four
CIVIL-DISCOVERY-COURT DUTY TO EVALUATE CLAIM OF GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE TO DISCOVERY REQUEST
Marylander is the defendant in a civil action alleging misrepresentation, concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff is the chapter 11 trustee in bankruptcy for Triad Healthcare, a nonprofit corporation of which Marylander was formerly an officer and employee. The trustee's theory is that the seller of two hospitals failed to disclose that the hospitals had been appraised at a significantly lower price than Triad paid for them. The defendants sought to compel discovery from a state agency of records which are relevant to his defense in the underlying case. The records are memoranda from the state agency to the Governor's Office. The trial court denied a motion to compel production, agreeing with the state agency that such memoranda are absolutely privileged on the grounds that correspondence to the Governor is exempt from disclosure as a public record, and a common law deliberative process privilege absolutely protects such interoffice communications.
HELD: Defendant is entitled by law to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The exemptions in the Public Records Act are in the context that, unless exempted, all public records may be examined by any member of the public, often the press, but conceivably any person with no greater interest than idle curiosity. Even in those rare cases where constitutional considerations require judicial declaration of a privilege not based on statute, the courts have utilized a balancing of the interests approach, and eschewed creating an absolute privilege. In the present case, the information was not disclosed to the trial court in camera. The trial court never examined the GAR's to evaluate the potential necessity in the interest of justice that the GAR's be disclosed in order to enable petitioner to present his defense in the pending litigation. The record shows that the trial court treated the privilege claim as absolute based on the Government Code. The trial court failed to consider petitioner's need for the evidence, nor did it even examine the evidence to evaluate its potential importance to the litigation. A writ issued directing the trial court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion to compel production of records and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cerritos Valley Bank v. Stirling
Case No. B133888
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four
CIVIL-CALIFORNIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-LIABILITY OF GUARANTOR OF DEBT-PRE DEFAULT WAIVER OF NOTICE OF SALE OF COLLATERAL
West Coast Microbreweries executed a promissory note in favor of Cerritos Valley Bank, together with a business loan agreement, a commercial security agreement, and a UCC-1 financing statement. The collateral was described in the UCC-1 statement as; "All inventory, accounts, equipment, general intangibles and fixtures." Stirling guaranteed the obligation, which included a waiver of, any right to require Lender to . . . give notice of the terms, time, and place of any sale of the collateral. A second promissory note was executed, with the security listed as specific items of microbrewery equipment. West Coast defaulted. The Bank obtained a writ of possession, took possession of the microbrewery equipment and sold the microbrewery equipment but did not give Stirling advance notice of the sale. The Bank sued Stirling for the deficiency after the sale. Stripling's motion for summary judgment was granted.
HELD: The California Uniform Commercial Code provides: The secured party must give to the debtor, if he or she has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his or her right to notification of sale notice in writing of the time and place of any public sale or of the time on or after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made. The UCC further provides that: To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in the subdivisions referred to below may not be waived or varied except as provided. If the secured creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey the law. If he does not obey the law, he may not have his deficiency judgment. Stirling's predefault waiver was void. Affirmed.
People v. Jenkins
Case No. S007522
Supreme Court of California
ORDER
Modification of opinion appearing at 22 Cal 4th 900, not affecting the judgment.
Wasserman's Archived Appellate Summaries
Back to Netlaw Libraries' Home Page