Wasserman's Appellate Summaries
September 8, 2000
By Lawrence Wasserman, Esq.
Netlaw Libraries welcomes back attorney Lawrence Wasserman as a new website contributor. We are pleased to announce that his guest column, which synopsizes the recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court, the six California appellate districts, as well as some of the recent and interesting decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, will be appearing as a regular feature for members and guests visiting the Netlaw Libraries website. We hope that you will find it to be a good way to start your legal research day and welcome your comments and criticisms regarding the column.
Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Bayona/Castro
Case No. 99-55035
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
INSURANCE-JURISDICTION-INTERPLEADER BY GROUP POLICY INSURER-ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE COUNTERCLAIM
Castro was a nurse employed by Good Samaritan Hospital. She was enrolled in an Aetna Life Insurance group policy governed by ERISA. Her sister, Emelita Castro, was to receive 85% of the insurance proceeds in trust for Evangeline's children and Evangeline's husband, Rey Bayona, was to receive 15% of the proceeds. After her death Rey claimed a community interest in 15% of the policy. Aetna interpleaded the policy proceeds and sought dismissal of Rey's counterclaim. The district court dismissed the counterclaim and discharged Aetna.
HELD: Interpleader provides a process by which a party may join all other claimants as adverse parties when their claims are such that the stakeholder may be exposed to multiple liability. Aetna was an ERISA fiduciary. The action for interpleader is equitable in nature and was brought to secure enforcement of an obligation under ERISA. The court had jurisdiction. The counterclaim was based on a state cause of action and is preempted by ERISA. Affirmed.
Andreiu v. Reno
Case No. 99-70274
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
*IMMIGRATION-TEMPORARY STAY OF REMOVAL ORDER-REQUIREMENT OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT ORDER PROHIBITED BY LAW
Andreiu is a native of Romania. He overstayed his visa to the U.S. His application for asylum was based on his testimony of how the authorities attempted to kill him after he tried to open a radio station to speak in opposition to the government. His application was denied by the IJ, because the events described seemed implausible. The BIA rejected the credibility finding of the IJ, but affirmed the denial of asylum, because he failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, or a clear probability of persecution, since he did not produce documentary evidence. The Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed Andreiu's removal.
HELD: Before the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996 stays of removal were generally automatic under the transitional rules. Because Andreiu's removal proceedings began after April 1, 1997, the transitional rules do not apply to his stay request. The IIRIRA now provides that, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law. This statute applies to a temporary stay. Stay denied.
Torres v. Prunty, Warden
Case No. 99-55662
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CRIMINAL-FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS-STANDARD OF REVIEW OF STATE COURT FACTUAL FINDINGS
The district court granted Torres' petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Torres's due process rights were violated when the state trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine whether Torres was competent to stand trial, despite considerable evidence suggesting that he was not.
HELD: The California state trial and appellate courts' findings that the evidence did not require a competency hearing are findings of fact to which the federal court must defer unless they are "unreasonable" within the meaning of the federal statute. It is clear that the "unreasonable application" clause, means more than mere incorrectness. It is the "clearly erroneous" standard that is applied to review of factual determinations by district courts. The Court found the determinations made were unreasonable and Torres was entitled to a hearing on his competency. Affirmed.
Aguilera v. Armstrong Pirelli Tire
Case No. 98-16899
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
LABOR-HIRING OF REPLACEMENT WORKERS DURING STRIKE-PROMISES OF PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT-PREEMPTION OF STATE CLAIMS BY LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-ACCRUAL OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Aguilera and other workers were hired as strike replacements during a United Rubber Workers' strike at Pirelli. They contend that they were promised they would be permanent employees. When the strike ended they were required to be members of the union and given the seniority of their hire date. Pirelli's tire sales dropped and Aguilera and the others with the lowest seniority were laid off. Without seeking a Union grievance procedure they filed suit. Summary judgment was for Pirelli. Aguilera then filed state law causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of individual employment contract, violation of the California Labor Code, and discharge in violation of the public policy. Summary judgment was for Pirelli, based on preemption by the Labor Management Relations Act, the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and lacked merit.
HELD: The LMRA preempts state law claims that are based directly on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement, and also preempts claims that are substantially dependent on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Where the position in dispute is covered by the CBA and any claims seeking to enforce the terms of the agreement are preempted. Pre-employment misrepresentations are preempted by the LMRA when the employee is subsequently hired under a CBA. The date Aguilera was laid off on September 1995 was the relevant accrual date for statute of limitations purposes, not the date of the first layoff in March. The instant lawsuit was filed February 27, 1997 and was not tolled during the appeal of the dismissal of the first action. To prevail on the Labor code violation Aguilera would have to show that Pirelli made a knowingly false representation regarding the permanency of their employment. There is no evidence in the record that Pirelli knew that it would have to rehire the striking workers. Affirmed.
Desaigourdar v. Meyercord
Case No. 98-17154
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
OTHER-SECURITIES FRAUD-FAILURE TO ESTIMATE VALUE OF ABANDONED OPPORTUNITY-REQUIREMENT FOR METICULOUS PLEADING OF SECURITIES FRAUD
California Micro Devices Corporation abandoned the acquisition of a 56% interest in a company. The company was subsequently sold of $60 million. Desaigourdar, as trustee of a charitable foundation sued officials of CMDC for securities fraud. The complaint was dismissed, for failure to comply with the strict requirement of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
HELD: The complaint clearly sounds in fraud. The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA require a plaintiff to identify: (1) each statement alleged to have been misleading; (2) the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading; and, (3) all facts on which that belief is formed with a high degree of meticulousness. Failure to disclose information that does not yet exist cannot be the predicate for liability. CMDC was not required to speculate about the value of potentially foregone opportunities and estimate the value. Affirmed.
Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District
Case No. 98-56853
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
OTHER-INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT-JURISDICTION OF THE CALIFORNIA SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARING OFFICE
Wyner brought a proceeding before the California Special Education Hearing Office seeking a due process hearing under the provisions of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. A settlement was reached, which provided that remedial tutoring services will be provided five (5) hours per week. The services were provided in five, forty-four minute periods because the class periods at Jonathan Wyner's school lasted for forty-four minutes. Wyner wanted the school to make up the additional 15 minutes per day. Wyner sought a determination from the SEHO of whether the school had complied. The SEHO found that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter. Wyner sued. The district court granted summary judgment to the school.
HELD: The California Education Code limits SEHO's jurisdiction to three enumerated circumstances. Failure to comply with an order emanating from a prior due process hearing is not within the specified jurisdiction. Affirmed.
United States v. Reyes-Platero
Case No. 99-50234
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ORDER
Amendment to opinion, filed July 11, 2000, not effecting the judgment.
Wasserman's Archived Appellate Summaries
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