Wasserman's Appellate Summaries
October 5, 2000
By Lawrence Wasserman, Esq.
Netlaw Libraries welcomes back attorney Lawrence Wasserman as a new website contributor. We are pleased to announce that his guest column, which synopsizes the recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court, the six California appellate districts, as well as some of the recent and interesting decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, will be appearing as a regular feature for members and guests visiting the Netlaw Libraries website. We hope that you will find it to be a good way to start your legal research day and welcome your comments and criticisms regarding the column.
*Guz v. Bechtel National
Case No. S062201
California Supreme Court
WRONGFUL TERMINATION-BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING-BREACH OF CONTRACT BY NOT FOLLOWING REDUCTION IN FORCE REQUIREMENTS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK
Guz, a longtime employee of Bechtel National was released at age 49 when his work unit was eliminated and its tasks were transferred to another Bechtel office. Guz sued for age discrimination, breach of an implied contract to be terminated only for good cause, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted Bechtel’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment was reversed on appeal.
HELD: The Court of Appeal used erroneous grounds to reverse summary judgment on Guz’s implied contract cause of action. There is a triable issue that Guz, like other Bechtel workers, had implied contractual rights under specific provisions of Bechtel’s written personnel policies. But neither the policies, nor other evidence, suggest any contractual restriction on Bechtel’s right to eliminate a work unit as it saw fit, even where dissatisfaction with unit performance was a factor in the decision. While the implied covenant requires mutual fairness in applying a contract’s actual terms, it cannot substantively alter those terms. If an employment is at will, and thus allows either party to terminate for any or no reason, the implied covenant cannot decree otherwise. Moreover, although any breach of the actual terms of an employment contract also violates the implied covenant, the measure of damages for such a breach remains solely contractual. Where breach of an actual term is alleged, a separate implied covenant claim, based on the same breach, is superfluous. On the other hand, where an implied covenant claim alleges a breach of obligations beyond the agreement’s actual terms, it is invalid. The allegation of the complaint, that Bechtel failed to follow its fair layoff policies when, during and after the reorganization, it made individual personnel decisions leading to Guz’s release, was not addressed by the Court of Appeal. Reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for consideration of the contractual question of a fail layoff practice.
People v. Johnson
Case No. B138497
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Six
CRIMINAL-INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL-FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE CHANGE IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE
Johnson pleaded no contest pleas to selling cocaine and possessing cocaine for sale. He admitted three prior prison terms, two prior juvenile adjudications, for residential burglary, and one prior felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the trial court struck the juvenile adjudications and sentenced appellant to prison for 15 years, 8 months. After he was sentenced, the California Supreme Court held that a juvenile adjudication for residential burglary does not qualify as a strike.
HELD: A defendant who pleads guilty and admits an enhancement is not entitled to withdraw his plea and admission because a subsequent judicial decision has reduced the maximum penalty for the charged offense and enhancement. His attorney was not ineffective, because it cannot be expected for the attorney to anticipate that an appellate court will later interpret the controlling sections in a manner contrary to the apparently prevalent contemporaneous interpretation. Affirmed.
People v. Chavez
Case No. C032716
California Court of Appeal, Third District
(Certified for publication with the exception of the Facts and parts I, III and IV of the Discussion.)
CRIMINAL-PRIOR MISDEMEANOR OF SEXUAL BATTERY USED TO IMPEACH DEFENDANT-CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE
Chavez was convicted of two counts of first degree robbery and true findings were made that he used a firearm during the commission of the crime. At trial evidence of Chavez' misdemeanor conviction for sexual battery was admitted and he was cross examined on the subject over objection.
HELD: In 1992 the California Supreme court abrogated the felony-only rule for impeachment and permitted misdemeanors to be used to impeach. The threshold inquiry remains whether the prior conduct constituted a crime of moral turpitude, which has some logical bearing upon the witness’ veracity. The Court held that sexual battery is a crime of moral turpitude. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Affirmed.
Thomas v. Oregon Fruit Products Co.
Case No. 98-36065
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
INSURANCE-STANDARD OF COURT REVIEW OF DENIAL OF BENEFITS UNDER ERISA POLICY-LANGUAGE OF POLICY GRANTING DISCRETION IN THE WAY CLAIMS ARE EVALUATED-NO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Thomas began working at Oregon Fruit Products Co. in June, 1993 and was enrolled in its long-term disability benefits plan for its employees. About a year later Thomas ceased work due to bronchitis. Thomas' condition worsened and she was hospitalized. Oregon Fruit terminated her in July 1994. On the day following her termination, Thomas' doctor determined that she could not return to work because of her worsening myasthenia gravis (a condition she has had since 1979). The disability plan insurer, Reliance rejected Thomas' claim, finding that her disability was caused by a pre-existing condition, which commenced less that a year and a day before first working for Oregon and was excluded from coverage. Summary judgment was for defendants.
HELD: A denial of benefits challenged under ERISA is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. The Court held that the policy requirement that claims for disability be submitted "to us," does not unambiguously grant Reliance discretion to evaluate claims as it sees fit. The district court incorrectly reviewed Reliance's decision for an abuse of discretion. The district court was required to review Reliance's factual findings for clear error. Under de novo review the district court would have been able to conduct a much broader review, considering anew both the legal and factual aspects of Thomas' claim. Remand is appropriate because a genuine issue of fact does exist as to whether Thomas' bronchitis and her resulting absence from work were related to her pre-existing condition, myasthenia gravis. At least two of Thomas' physicians believed they were not. On the other hand, prior medical records and diagnoses support Reliance's conclusion that myasthenia gravis was the cause of Thomas' bronchitis. Since the Policy is ambiguous, the district court's grant of Reliance's motion for summary judgment was in error. Remanded for de novo consideration of Thomas' claim by the district court. Thomas is not entitled to a jury trial because the remedy she seeks is equitable in nature. Affirmed and reversed in part.
Noh v. Immigration And Naturalization Service
Case No. 98-70982
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
IMMIGRATION-REVOCATION OF STUDENT VISA-NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR STATED GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION OF VISA
Noh, a native and citizen of Korea, was denied entry into the United States because the State Department had revoked his non immigrant "F-1" student visa on the ground that it was "illegally obtained." The INS initiated exclusion proceedings. At a hearing the IJ concluded that it had no jurisdiction to review the Sate Department determination and Noh was ordered to be excluded. The BIA affirmed.
HELD: The transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act because Noh's exclusion proceedings commenced before the Act's effective date of April 1, 1997. Before IIRIRA, an IJ had the authority to determine whether an alien seeking admission was excludable. An alien is excludable if he does not possess a valid visa. When, as in this case, the alien had a visa that was revoked, a necessary part of the IJ's inquiry into the alien's excludability is to determine whether the revocation was lawful. The stated reason for revocation "illegally obtained" is not one of the statutory grounds for revocation. Noh is not obligated to establish the reason why the government revoked his visa. To require Noh to explain what the government meant by "illegally obtained" is an almost impossible burden that would reward the government for being unclear. Noh's visa was improperly revoked and his privileges under the visa are reinstated.
Morris v.Woodford, Warden
Case No. 99-99028
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
CRIMINAL-NECESSITY FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AS TO EACH ISSUE-ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
Morris was sentenced to death in California for a 1985 murder. The district court denied his first habeas corpus petition on the grounds of failure to exhaust state remedies. Morris' petition to the California Supreme Court was denied as untimely and, without elaboration, on the merits. His second federal petition was denied in large part as procedurally barred, as a result of the denial of the state petition on procedural grounds. On some claims the magistrate recommended that they be granted as to a mistake in the printed instructions for the penalty phase trial. The district court found the error harmless and denied the petition. The district court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause.
HELD: Because Petitioner filed his petition before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act the provisions of that Act do not apply. However, the Court held that Morris was required by the AEDPA to receive a Certificate of Appealability as to each issue. The Court treated the appeal as an application for a COA. The Court held that petitioner made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and is entitled to a Certificate of Probable Cause. The district court's procedural ruling was debatable among jurists of reason. The denial of Morris' petition to the California Supreme Court, on the ground of "untimeliness" is not an independent and adequate state-law ground for denial of federal court review. Morris has facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right on three of the procedurally barred issues. In a capital case, a habeas petitioner who asserts a colorable claim to relief, and who has never been given the opportunity to develop a factual record on that claim, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court. Vacated the district court judgment and remanded. The Court deferred ruling on the claims for which a COA was issued, until resolution of the other issues remanded.
*Change in law, interesting case, or just watch out!
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